Editor’s note: R. Scott Smith has graciously allowed us to republish his series, “Making Sense of Morality.” You can find the original post here.

Introduction

There is one more naturalist’s ethical views to consider, and they are quite unique compared to others we have seen. Rather than deny the existence of objective, universal moral properties (i.e., types), Erik Wielenberg (b. 1972) affirms them. To him, they are Platonic kinds of entities, not being reducible to just physical things.

Wielenberg’s Ethics

For him, there are natural facts and moral facts. Particular moral instances (tokens) supervene upon particular physical facts. So, the particular moral properties instanced in a given act or person depend completely upon its non-moral properties.

 Why do moral properties supervene on non-moral ones? Wielenberg appeals to the “making” relation, which is a kind of causation. There is a natural fact of an act of deliberate cruelty that makes the act morally wrong (Wielenberg, 16). To him this making relation is a brute fact, one without further explanation.

Moreover, moral properties are epiphenomenal; they do not have any causal powers of their own to exert upon natural facts (Wielenberg, 13-14). He also allows the existence of the felt-qualities (i.e., qualia) of experiences, desires, etc. Beyond these concessions, humans basically are made of physical stuff.

Wielenberg also appeals to certain inalienable rights and obligations that humans have. These have arisen due to the cognitive capacities endowed upon us by evolution (Wielenberg, 56). These include, for instance, capacities to reason, set goals, suffer, and fall in love (51).

Assessment

Wielenberg seems to recognize that morals are not just descriptive things, which they would seem to be if naturalism is true. Instead, there is something irreducibly normative about them. Moreover, he steers clear of potential problems with morals if they are just particulars; after all, why should we all be just and loving, or not murder or rape, if those aren’t universals?

Nevertheless, there are a few problems with his view to highlight. First, in his example about the natural fact that an act is deliberately cruel, he seems to pack a normative, moral notion, cruelty, into his description of the natural, non-moral properties. Thus, it seems he presupposes that the natural is intrinsically moral. Yet, this move is at odds with naturalism, for it would posit essences to natural things. As we have seen, too, naturalists deny that there are intrinsically moral qualities that are part of nature.

Moreover, since moral properties are epiphenomenal, it is hard to see how we could know them. Since humans basically are physical, it seems we would come to know something by that thing causing a physical state in us. But since moral properties instanced in us cannot cause anything, they cannot cause such physical states. Thus it seems we could not begin to know them.

Consider also his claim of inalienable moral rights. On his view, the moral equality all humans would have depends upon their natural properties. Yet, we differ in terms of these natural properties. Not all humans have these cognitive abilities, and they differ in degree. If so, why should someone who lacks in these natural abilities be treated as equal with another who possesses them to greater degrees?

Nor would moral properties have anything to do with the moral judgments we make. Our cognitive capacities are the results of evolutionary adaptations, and while Wielenberg seems to think that evolution could give rise to capacities to know truth, it is far more likely that particular adaptations will not give us knowledge of the truth. After all, what counts in evolution is not truth, but survival and the passing on of one’s genes. Furthermore, if a murder is committed, then clearly it will shape our moral beliefs about that action (that it is wrong) and what should be done about it (e.g., a person should be convicted).

Moreover, there will be evolutionary variations in adaptations amongst all humans. If this is so, then, as Angus Menuge observes, it seems people across the globe could have varieties of moral beliefs, including ones that do not uphold Wielenberg’s inalienable rights of other humans, or our core morals.

For Further Reading

Angus Menuge, Review of Robust Ethics, in Faith and Philosophy 33:2 (2016).

Erik Wielenberg, Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism.

R. Scott Smith is a Christian philosopher and apologist, with special interests in ethics, knowledge, and seeing the body of Christ live in the fullness of the Spirit and truth.