Editor’s note: This article was originally posted at MandM. It has been posted here with permission of author.

David Brink has objected to a divine command theory of ethics by contending such theories cannot vindicate the objectivity of ethics. Brink begins by defending a particular conception of the objectivity of ethics and then argues that a divine command theory fails to meet that conception.  Brink writes:

Our commitment to the objectivity of ethics is a deep one. Ethics is objective just in case there are facts or truths about what is good or bad and right or wrong that obtain independently of the moral beliefs or attitudes of appraisers. A commitment to objectivity is part of a commitment to the normativity of ethics. Moral judgments express normative claims about what we should do and care about. As such, they presuppose standards of behavior and concern that purport to be correct, that could and should guide conduct and concern, and that we might fail to accept or live up to. Normativity, therefore, presupposes fallibility, and fallibility implies objectivity. Of course, this presupposition could be mistaken. There might be no objective moral standards. Our moral thinking and discourse might be systematically mistaken. But this would be a revisionary conclusion, to be accepted only as the result of extended and compelling argument that the commitments of ethical objectivity are unsustainable. In the meantime, we should treat the objectivity of ethics as a kind of default assumption or working hypothesis [1]

 He continues:

…Ethical subjectivism is one way to deny ethical objectivity. It claims that what is good or bad and right or wrong depends on the moral beliefs or attitudes of appraisers. But voluntarism is just subjectivism at the highest level. If God exists and is both omniscient and perfectly good, then his approval – if only we could ascertain it – would be a perfectly reliable – indeed, infallible – indicator of what was good or right. This is what naturalism claims. But voluntarism implies that God’s attitudes play a metaphysical, not just an epistemic, role in morality; his attitudes make things good or right. This is a form of subjectivism about ethics. But then the supposition that morality requires a religious foundation, as voluntarism insists, threatens, rather than vindicates, the objectivity of morality.[2]

The argument can be summarised as follows:

[1] Our commitment to morality presupposes that moral requirements are objective

[2] Moral requirements are objective just in case there are facts or truths about what is right or wrong that obtain independently of the moral beliefs or attitudes of appraisers.

[3] If divine command metaethics is true, facts about right and wrong depend on the attitude of an appraiser.

The conclusion is that a divine command theory fails to vindicate and instead contradicts a presupposition of our commitment to morality. 

This argument is invalid to see why consider the definition of objectivity Brink proposes in [2]; “Ethics is objective just in case there are facts or truths about what is good or bad and right or wrong that obtain independently of the moral beliefs or attitudes of appraisers“[3]. Central to his definition is the idea that objectivity involves appraiser independence. The truth of a moral judgement does not depend on the attitude of the appraiser.

However, there are two ways one can understand the notion of appraiser independence here, which correspond (loosely) to different accounts of objectivity in meta-ethical literature. One way is that truths about what is right and wrong obtain independently of the beliefs and attitudes of actual human appraisers. i.e. appraisers like you and I who are imperfect reasoners with limited information, subject to biases and make errors and mistakes.  

Chris Meyers expounds an understanding of appraiser independence along these lines. Meyers states that moral truth is objective when it’s “truth is independent of any particular appraisers or appraisals, but not independent of appraising generally”[4]…

The truth of a moral judgment is determined not by our actual judgments – which might be arbitrary, biased, or otherwise irrational – but on the judgments we would hypothetically make under ideal circumstances. An act is wrong, for example, if it would be prohibited by principles regulating interpersonal conduct that would be freely agreed to by rational agents in ideal conditions.

This understanding of appraiser independence distinguishes the attitudes and beliefs of actual human appraisers and the attitudes and beliefs that an appraiser would hold in ideal conditions: conditions of full information, flawlessly rationality, impartiality, etc. Moral judgements are subjective when facts about what is right and wrong depend on the attitude of actual human appraisers towards those judgements. 

This understanding of objectivity is associated with constructionist accounts of morality. However, it is also implicit in the writings of moral realists who account for moral facts in terms of the attitudes of ideal observers or facts about what communities or individuals would rationally desire or endorse under conditions of full information. [5]

The second understanding of appraiser independence is that moral judgements are objective just in case truths about right and wrong obtain independently of what any appraiser thinks. This would include actual human appraisers, but also idealized agents, hypothetical ideal observers or even God.

These two different understandings of “appraiser independence” help us see Brink’s argument’s subtle flaw. Suppose we adopt the first understanding of appraiser independence. Brink’s argument becomes: 

[1] Our commitment to morality presupposes that moral requirements are objective 

[2] moral requirements are objective if and only if facts or truths about what is right or wrong obtain independently of the moral beliefs or attitudes of any actual human appraisers. 

[3] If divine command metaethics is true, facts about right and wrong, depend on the attitude of an actual human appraiser. 

Taken this way [3] is obviously false. Divine command metaethics does not make facts about right and wrong depend upon an actual human appraiser. It entails that moral facts depend on God’s attitudes. Brink is aware of this fact. He argues that divine command metaethics is “subjectivism at the highest level” because “God’s attitudes play a metaphysical, not just an epistemic, role in morality; his attitudes make things good or right” Moreover, in the very same paragraph, Brink states that: “If God exists and is both omniscient and perfectly good, then his approval – if only we could ascertain it – would be a perfectly reliable – indeed, infallible.” So, God, would be a person who appraises under ideal conditions.  He is not an appraiser like you or I: an imperfect reasoner with limited information, subject to biases, and makes errors and mistakes. 

For this reason, I think it is best to read Brink as adopting the second understanding of appraiser independence in his argument. Hence we should read the argument as:

[1] Our commitment to morality presupposes that moral requirements are objective 

[2] moral requirements are objective if and only if facts or truths about what is right or wrong that obtain independently of the moral beliefs or attitudes of any human or ideal appraisers. 

[3]If divine command metaethics is true, facts about right and wrong, depend on the attitude of an ideal appraiser. 

Given Brink’s own meta-ethical views, this seems to be a much more plausible interpretation of his intent. This reading of the argument also makes [3] true. Divine command theories do entail that facts about right and wrong depend on the attitude of an ideal appraiser. In this respect, it is similar to ideal observer theories, constructivist theories and various forms of response-dependent realism. All of which account for moral facts in terms of the responses of appraisers under ideal conditions. 

The problem, however, is that for this argument to be valid, the word “objective must have the same meaning in premises [1] and [2]. Consequently, we must read premise [1] as claiming that our commitment to morality presupposes that moral requirements are appraiser independent in the sense Brink defines in premise [2].

However, there doesn’t appear to be any reason for thinking that our commitment to the objectivity of morality commits us to this stronger conception of appraisal independence. Note again the argument Brink gives for [1]

Ethics is objective just in case there are facts or truths about what is good or bad and right or wrong that obtain independently of the moral beliefs or attitudes of appraisers. A commitment to objectivity is part of a commitment to the normativity of ethics. Moral judgments express normative claims about what we should do and care about. As such, they presuppose standards of behaviour and concern that purport to be correct, that could and should guide conduct and concern, and that we might fail to accept or live up to. Normativity, therefore, presupposes fallibility, and fallibility implies objectivity.[6] 

Note the inference here; Brink concludes that normative judgements assume that moral facts are appraiser independent. Why? Because normative judgements presuppose that “we” can fail to accept and live up to moral judgements. “We” are “fallible” and can make mistaken moral evaluations. Because “we” are fallible in this way that facts about what is right and wrong must be independent of the moral beliefs and attitudes of appraisers. 

This inference is valid if the appraisers in question are actual human appraisers. i.e. appraisers like you and I: imperfect reasoners, who have  limited information, are subject to biases, and make errors and mistakes. If “we” can have mistaken moral attitudes and beliefs, then correct moral judgements are independent of our attitudes and the attitudes of beings like us who share these limitations. But the argument is a non sequitur if Brink the appraisers in question include agents that appraise in ideal conditions. The fact, “we” can have mistaken moral attitudes and beliefs entails that correct moral judgements are independent of our attitudes. It does not entail that correct moral judgment is independent of appraisers’ attitudes who don’t make those mistakes. Ex hypothesis: agents who appraise under Idealised conditions, are not subject to the kind of biases, errors, and mistakes we are. 

I think this problem will afflict any attempt to argue that divine command metaethics does not account for the objective nature of moral judgements. Reasons for thinking morality is objective are typically based fallibility of the appraisers in question. The fact that individuals and societies can make mistaken appraisals. That history demonstrates reformers have pointed out flaws in our moral thinking and correctly advocated change against the tide of social pressure. That we think certain actions are wrong even if everyone approved of them. That societies have made progress in their judgements over time. That moral disagreement involves contradicting judgements other appraisers make and pointing out flaws in their reasoning or facts missed. That we don’t consider the appraisals made by racists and anti-Semites as correct as those made by people who advocate benevolence and charity. These features of moral discourse point to the fact that human appraisers are fallible: fallibility implies that the moral evaluations I make and what is wrong are distinct things and not always co-extensive. However, these features of our discourse do not presuppose that the truth of moral judgements is independent the attitudes of those who appraise under ideal conditions. They do not support the strong appraiser independence needed to justify the claim that God’s commands are not objective facts.